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Abstract
We consider an auction type equilibrium model with an insider in line with the one originally introduced
by Kyle in 1985 and then extended to the continuous time setting by Back in 1992. The novelty introduced
with this paper is that we deal with a general price functional depending on the whole past of the aggregate
demand, i.e. we work with path-dependency. By using the functional Itô calculus, we provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. Furthermore, we consider both the cases of
a risk-neutral and a risk-averse insider.
Key words: Kyle model, market microstructure, equilibrium, insider trading, stochastic control, semi-
martingales, functional Itô calculus.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that privileged information and informational asymmetries are everywhere in the real
economy. In his pioneering work, Kyle (1985) constructed a model in a discrete time setting with market
makers, uninformed traders and one insider, who knows the fundamental value of an asset at a certain fixed
released time. Also, the model included a price functional relating market prices and the total demand. Back
(1992) extends Kyle’s model to the continuous time case. Since these worked appeared, several generalisations
and extensions have been produced. To mention some, we have Back and Pedersen (1998), who consider
a dynamic fundamental price and Gaussian noises with time varying volatility; Cho (2003), who considers
pricing functions depending on the path of the demand process and also studies the case when the informed
trader is risk-averse; Lasserre (2004), who considers a multivariate setting; Back and Baruch (2004) where
the market depth (i.e. the marginal effect on price of the volume traded) depends on the market price of
the stock; Aase et al. (2012a), (2012b), who put emphasis on filtering techniques to solve the equilibrium
problem; Campi and Çetin (2007), who consider a defaultable bond instead of a stock as in the Kyle-Back
model and also consider the knowledge of the default time as the insider’s privileged information; Danilova
(2010), who deals with non-regular pricing rules; Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) who take a random release
time into account; Campi et al. (2013), who consider again a defaultable bond, but this time they consider
the privileged information to be represented by some dynamic signal related with the default time; and
Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) where the market depth depends on the (random) volatility of the noise
in the market. In Corcuera and Di Nunno (2018), the authors propose a general framework to include all
the particular extensions mentioned above and study the general characteristics of the equilibria. Recently
Corcuera, Di Nunno and Fajardo (2019) have also considered the same general situation, but with a random
price pressure and a random release time of information.
In this paper we propose a step even further and we consider a price functional that depends on the whole
path of the aggregate demand. We study the properties of the equilibrium and sufficient and necessary
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conditions for the existence of equilibria. Also we study both the case of a risk-neutral and risk-averse
insider. With this work we extend substantially the present frontiers of the literature on this theme. We also
note that the the analysis of price functional of these type will involve the recently introduced functional
calculus, see e.g. [12], and this work represents a good venture to see these new mathematical techniques
applied in economics and finance.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the model and we define the equilibrium for
the admissible strategies. Section 3 presents some needed background material from functional Itô calculus.
In the Section 4, we also suggest some general results that allow to reduce the set of admissible strategies
on which the insider can find its optimal performance and hence describe the equilibrium. Also, we give
necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain an equilibrium under very general classes of pricing rules. In
this section, we consider the two cases of a risk-neutral and a risk adverse insider. Section 5 is devoted to
the study of necessary conditions for an equilibrium, without fixing a priori, up to smoothness conditions,
the set of pricing rules. We observe that these latter results motivate and justify those restrictions imposed
on the classes of pricing rules considered in the study of Section 4. The last two sections are dedicated to
examples of classes of pricing rules and examples of equilibrium models, correspondingly.
2 The model and equilibrium
We consider a market with two assets, a stock and a bank account with interest rate r equal to zero for the
sake of simplicity. The trading is continuous in time over the period [0,∞) and it is order driven. There
is a (possibly random) release time of information τ < ∞ a.s., when the fundamental value of the stock is
revealed. The fundamental value process represents the actual value of the asset, which would be the same
as the market price of the asset only if all the information was public. We could say, with Malkiel (2007),
that the fundamental value is the intrinsic value of a stock, via an analysis of the balance sheet, the expected
future dividends, and the growth prospects of a company. The fundamental value process is denoted by V .
We shall denote the market price of the stock at time t by Pt. This represents the market evaluation of the
asset. Just after the revelation time τ, the price of the stock coincides with the fundamental value. Then we
consider Pt defined only on t ≤ τ . Obviously, it is possible that Pt 6= Vt for t ≤ τ .
We assume that all the random variables and processes mentioned are defined in the same complete filtered
probability space (Ω,F ,H,P) where the filtration H and any other filtration considered in this present work
are complete and right-continuous by taking, when necessary, the usual augmentation.
There are three kinds of traders. A number of liquidity traders, who trade for liquidity or hedging reasons,
an informed trader or insider, who has privileged information about the firm and can deduce its fundamental
value, and the market makers, who set the market price and clear the market.
2.1 The agents and the equilibrium
At time t, the insider’s information is the full informationHt and her flow of information is represented by the
filtration H = (Ht)t≥0. Since this is also the filtration with respect to which all the processes considered in
the present work are adapted, we shall omit to write it in the notation. A random release time of information
τ is considered from insider’s perspective to be of one of these types:
• τ it is bounded and predictable,
• τ it is not a predictable stopping time, but it is independent of the observable variables.
We assume that the fundamental value V is a continuous martingale such that σ2V (t) :=
d[V,V ]t
dt is well
defined.
Hereafter we describe in detail the three types of agents involved in this market model, namely their role, their
demand process, and their information. Let Z be the aggregate demand process of the liquidity traders. We
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recall that these are a large number of traders motivated by liquidity or hedging reasons. They are perceived
by the insider as constituting noise in the market, thus also called noise traders. It is assumed that Z is a
continuous, square integrable, martingale, starting at zero, independent of V , and such that σ2Z(t) :=
d[Z,Z]t
dt
is well defined. As it is shown in Corcuera et al. (2010), if Z had jumps, an equilibrium would not be
possible.
Remark 1 In this equilibrium model, the time τ and the processes V and Z are exogenously given.
Market makers clear the market giving the market prices. They rely on the information given by the total
aggregate demand Y , which they observe, and the release time τ , that is a stopping time for them. Hence,
their information flow is: F = (Ft)t≥0, where Ft = σ¯(Ys, τ ∧ s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t). Here σ¯ denotes the σ-field
corresponding to the usual augmentation of the natural filtration.
The total aggregate demand is defined as Y := X + Z, where X denotes the insider demand process, which
is naturally assumed to be a predictable process and also a càdlàg semimartingale:
(A1) Xt = Mt +At +
∫ t
0
θsds, t ≥ 0,
where M is a continuous martingale with M0 = 0,
A a bounded variation predictable process with At =
∑
0<s≤t
(Xs −Xs−) and A0 = 0,
θ is a càdlàg adapted process.
Strategies X satisfying (A.1) are called admissible. Market makers provide liquidity and fix the market
prices Pt, for all t, based on the total demand Y , resulting in the functionals:
Pt = Pt(Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
It is natural to assume that prices are strictly increasing with the total demand Y . We characterize this
form of monotonicity here below.
Definition 1 We say that P is strictly increasing as a functional of {Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t} if, for any t ≤ τ , and
for any pair {Ys, Y
′
s , 0 ≤ s ≤ t} for which there exits some time u ∈ [0, t] such that, fixed ω,
Ys (ω) = Y
′
s (ω) , 0 ≤ s ≤ u, and Ys (ω) < Y
′
s (ω) for u < s ≤ t, a.s.
or
Ys (ω) = Y
′
s (ω) , 0 ≤ s < u, and Ys (ω) < Y
′
s (ω) for u ≤ s ≤ t, a.s.
we have that
P ′t = Pt(Y
′
s , 0 ≤ s ≤ t) > Pt = Pt(Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Remark 2 We also could say that P is strictly increasing at the path {Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t} if it is strictly in-
creasing when we consider all the paths {Ys∧u, 0 ≤ u ≤ t}, s ∈ [0, t].
From the economic point of view, due to the competition among market makers, the market prices are
competitive, in the sense that
Pt = E(Vt|Ft), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ. (1)
Therefore (Pt)0≤t≤τ is an F-martingale.
Definition 2 The couple (P,X) is an equilibrium if market prices admit a pricing rule (i.e. a functional
of Y ), that we shall name equilibrium pricing rule,
Pt = Pt(Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
such that, at the same time, the market prices P are competitive given X, i.e.
Pt = E(Vt|Ft), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ,
and the strategy X is optimal for the insider given the prices P .
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Now we have to make precise what an optimal strategy for the insider is. The informed trader aims at
maximising the expected final utility of her wealth. Let W be the wealth process corresponding to the
insider’s portfolio X . To obtain the formula for the insider’s wealth assume that trades occur at times
0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ... ≤ tN = τ. If at time ti−1 there is an order to buy Xti − Xti−1 shares, its cost will be
Pti × (Xti −Xti−1), so there is a change in the insider’s bank account given by
−Pti × (Xti −Xti−1) = −Pti−1 × (Xti −Xti−1)−
(
Pti − Pti−1
)
× (Xti −Xti−1),
where the second term in the right-hand side accounts for the impact of the demand on the current price.
Due to the fact that the price of the asset equals its fundamental value at the release time τ , there is, in
addition, the extra income XτVτ . Then the total wealth at τ is given by
Wτ = −
N∑
i=1
Pti−1 × (Xti −Xti−1)−
N∑
i=1
(
Pti − Pti−1
)
× (Xti −Xti−1) +XτVτ ,
so taking the limit with the time between trades going to zero, we have
Wτ = −
∫ τ
0
Pt−dXt − [P,X ]τ +XτVτ
where (here and throughout the whole article) Pt− := lims↑t Ps a.s.
Then the informed trader aims at maximising
E(U (Wτ )) = E
(
U
(
−
∫ τ
0
Pt−dXt − [P,X ]τ +XτVτ
))
(2)
for a given utility function U , that is, a strictly increasing and concave function satisfying the Inada condi-
tions. The case when U is the identity function corresponds to the so called risk-neutral case. The insider’s
strategy X of type (A.1) providing the maximum is called optimal.
3 Regularity of the functionals. The functional Itô formula
Trading is developed in the context of imperfect competition, in the sense that prices are affected by the
demand, that is Pt = Pt(Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t). Here and in the sequel, we shall write Y·t to indicate the path of the
process Y from zero to t:
Y·t(s) := Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t.
Notice that we also can look Y·t as the process Y stopped at t, in such a way that
Y·t(s) :=
{
Ys for 0 ≤ s ≤ t
Yt for t ≤ s ≤ τ
Therefore we can write, alternatively, Pt = Pt(Y·t) and to consider Pt as a functional of the process Y stopped
at t. We recall that this functional is assumed to be strictly increasing in the total aggregate demand Y , see
Definition 1. We shall also add some regularity on the functionals we are going to consider when needed.
We shall also consider the following perturbation of a process Y . For h ∈ R, we define
Y h·t (s) :=
{
Ys for 0 ≤ s < t
Yt + h for t ≤ s ≤ τ
.
In the sequel, we are going to use a functional version of the Itô formula obtained by functional Itô calculus.
We give here some definitions and the results necessary to our scopes as can be found in Cont and Fournié
(2013).
Now we can define the continuity of the functionals with respect to time and to the path of the process.
Given two processes Y and Z, we consider a distance between the two stopped processes Y·t and Z·t´ defined
by
d∞(Y·t, Z·t´) := ‖Y·t − Z·t´‖∞ + |t− t´| .
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Definition 3 A functional P is said to be left-continuous at (t, Y·t) if for all ε > 0 there exist η > 0, such
that, for all 0 ≤ t´ ≤ t ≤ τ
d∞(Y·t, Z·t′) < η ⇒ |Pt(Y·t)− Pt´(Z·t´)| < ε.
P is said to be left-continuous if it is left-continuous at any (t, Y·t). Right-continuity is defined analogously.
Continuity means that left- and right-continuity occur at the same time. If, in the previous definition, we
consider only times t´ = t then we say that the functional is said to be continuous at fixed times. It can be
seen that continuity at fixed times implies that the process (Pt(Y·t))0≤t≤T is adapted if Y is adapted.
Since the space of càdlàg functions is not separable under the sup-norm, we need the following additional
regularity, even for the continuous functionals defined above.
Definition 4 A functional P is said to be boundedness preserving if for every K there exists a constant
CK such that:
∀t ≤ T, ‖Y·t‖∞ < K ⇒ |Pt(Y·t)| < CK .
Definition 5 We call horizontal derivative of the functional P at (t, Y·t), the limit given by
DtPt := lim
∆t↓0
Pt+∆t(Y·t)− Pt(Y·t)
∆t
,
provided it exists.
Example 1 From the definition, it is easy to see that
DtG(Yt) = 0, DtF (t, Yt) = ∂tF (t, Yt),
for any smooth functions G,F . Also, for any integrable h, we have
Dt
∫ t
0
h(Ys)ds = h(Yt).
Furthermore, for a smooth integrable function f and a Brownian motion W , we obtain
Dt
(∫ t
0
f(s,Ws)dWs
)
= −
1
2
∂yf(t,Wt).
A justification of the last statement comes from the usual Itô formula assuming that f(·, ·) = ∂yF (·, ·). In
fact, it is enough to take horizontal derivatives in both sides of∫ t
0
f(s,Ws)dWs = F (t,Wt)− F (0,W0)−
∫ t
0
∂sF (s,Ws)ds−
1
2
∫ t
0
∂yf(s,Ws)ds,
to obtain the result.
Definition 6 We call vertical derivative of the functional P at (t, Y·t) the limit, provided it exists, given by
∇Y Pt := lim
h→0
Pt(Y
h
·t )− Pt(Y·t)
h
.
Example 2 If, as above, we consider some smooth functions G,F , we have
∇YG(Yt) =
d
dy
G(Yt), ∇Y F (t, Yt) = ∂yF (t, Yt)
and for an integrable h we have
∇Y
∫ t
0
h(Ys)ds = 0.
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Moreover, with integrability assumptions on f and for the Brownian motion W we have
∇W
(∫ t
0
f(s,Ws)dWs
)
= f(s,Ws).
In fact, assuming as in the previous example that f(·, ·) = ∂yF (·, ·), the classical Itô formula gives∫ t
0
f(s,Ws)dWs = F (t,Wt)− F (0,W0)−
∫ t
0
∂sF (s,Ws)ds−
1
2
∫ t
0
∂yf(s,Ws)ds,
then, taking the vertical derivative on both sides, we have
∇W
(∫ t
0
f(s,Ws)dWs
)
= ∂yF (t,Wt) = f(t,Wt).
Remark 3 In general D and ∇ do not commute. If we set
Lt := [Dt,▽W ] = Dt ▽W −▽W Dt,
then we have that
Lt
(∫ t
0
f(s,Ws)dWs
)
= [Dt,▽W ]
(∫ t
0
f(s,Ws)dWs
)
= Dt▽W
(∫ t
0
f(s,Ws)dWs
)
−▽WDt
(∫ t
0
f(s,Ws)dWs
)
= Dtf(t,Wt) +
1
2
▽2W f(t,Wt) 6= 0,
if (f(t,Wt))t≥0 is not a local martingale.
Definition 7 We say that a left-continuous functional belongs to Cj,kb if it is j-times horizontally differ-
entiable with derivatives continuous at fixed points and boundedness preserving, and it is k-times vertically
differentiable with left-continuous and boundedness preserving derivatives.
Theorem 1 (Functional Itô formula). If Y is a continuous semimartingale and P is C1,2b , then
Pt(Y·t) = P0(Y0) +
∫ t
0
DsPsds+
∫ t
0
∇Y PsdYs +
1
2
∫ t
0
∇2Y Psd[Y, Y ]s, P-a.s. 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
Proof. See Theorem 4.1 in Cont and Fournié (2013).
4 Necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium
In this section we present necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium when the
release time τ and the pricing functional satisfy some conditions. The nature of these conditions will be
further studied in the next section. In this analysis we shall consider both a risk-neutral insider and a
risk-averse insider with exponential utility function.
First, we have the following result that reduces the set of strategies in which we find the optimum in the
optimisation problem here above considered. An analogous result is given in Corcuera et al. (2019).
Proposition 1 Assume that the functional P is left-continuous, bounded preserving and strictly increasing,
then admissible strategies X with a continuous martingale part or jumps are suboptimal in the class of all
predictable semimartingale strategies.
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Proof. Since we assume that the functional P is strictly increasing with Y = X + Z, we have that
[P,X ] > 0
for strategies with a continuous martingale part. Now if we approximate such strategy X by a polygonal
approximation, say X˜, since∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
P˜t−dX˜t −
∫ τ
0
Pt−dXt
∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
P˜t−dX˜t −
∫ τ
0
P˜t−dXt
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
(
P˜t− − Pt−
)
dXt
∣∣∣∣ , (3)
we can approximate
∫ τ
0
Pt−dXt by
∫ τ
0
P˜t−dX˜t , where P˜t = Pt
(
X˜·t
)
. In fact, fixed ω, if we consider a dyadic
partition Πn of [0, τ ] and X˜ the polygonal approximation to X, for all ε > 0, we can take n such that∣∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
P˜t−dX˜t −
n∑
i=1
P˜ti−1(X˜ti − X˜ti−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
P˜t−dX˜t −
n∑
i=1
P˜ti−1(Xti −Xti−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε
and ∣∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
P˜t−dXt −
n∑
i=1
P˜ti−1(Xti −Xti−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε a.s.
As for the second summand of the right-hand side of (3) we can apply the dominated convergence theorem
for stochastic integrals. As consequence, we can eliminate the negative contribution of [P,X ]τ and approx-
imate P as much as we want by continuity of the price functional. Therefore we can increase the value
of −
∫ τ
0 Pt−dXt − [P,X ]τ + XτVτ if we take X˜ instead of X . A similar argument applies for the case of
strategies with jumps.
Since we are going to consider left-continuous boundedness preserving functionals in the sequel, the set of
admissible insider’s strategies (A1) can be reduced to those strategies X satisfying
(A1′) Xt =
∫ t
0
θsds, for all t ≥ 0, where θ is a càdlàg adapted process.
Furthermore, the goal of the insider becomes to maximise the performance
J(X) := E (U(Wτ )) = E
(
U
(∫ τ
0
(Vτ − Pt)dXt
))
(4)
over the set of admissible strategies X satisfying (A1′).
Remark 4 Observe that, in view of (A1′), we have d[Y, Y ]t = σ
2
Z(t)dt.
We also have a general result in the case when τ is a predictable stopping time for the insider. The same
result is given in Corcuera et al. (2019).
Proposition 2 If τ is a predictable stopping time for the insider and X is an optimal strategy then
Vτ = Pτ a.s.
Proof. If the insider’s strategy is such that Vτ− − Pτ− 6= 0 then it is suboptimal since the insider could
approximate a jump at τ with the same sign of Vτ−−Pτ− by an absolutely continuous strategy and improving
her wealth, as it is shown in the previous proposition.
Remark 5 From the economic point of view, due to Bertrand’s type competition among market makers, in
the equilibrium market prices are rational, or competitive, in the sense that the competitive price is a price
such that the expectation of the market maker’s profit equals zero. In fact, the total final wealth WMτ of the
market makers is given by
WMτ := −Yτ (Vτ − Pτ )−
∫ τ
0
YtdPt,
then, if Pt = E (Vt|Ft), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ see (1), under the assumption that E
(∫ τ
0 Y
2
t d[P, P ]t
)
< ∞, we have that
E
(
WMτ
)
= 0.
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4.1 Main results
First, we consider the risk-neutral case.
Theorem 2 Suppose that τ = T and that for all t < T , the price functional P is C1,3b and such that
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t) = 0, (5)
with
LPt := [Dt,▽W ] = 0 (6)
and
▽Y Pt = G(t, Pt), (7)
where G(t, y) ≥ C > 0 is C1,2. Assume that E
(∫ T
0
(Pt − Vt)
2 (
σ2Z(t) + σ
2
V (t)
)
dt
)
<∞.
Then there is an equilibrium in the risk-neutral case if and only if
(i) PT = VT , (ii) Y is an F-martingale
Proof. Firstly, we prove that (i) and (ii) are sufficient conditions. Set
I(t, y, v) :=
∫ y
v
z − v
G(t, z)
dz.
Then, by the Itô formula, we have
I(T, PT , VT ) = I(0, P0, V0) +
∫ T
0
∂1Idt+
∫ T
0
∂2IdPt +
∫ T
0
∂3IdVt
+
∫ T
0
∂23Id[V, P ]t +
1
2
∫ T
0
∂22Id[P, P ]t +
1
2
∫ T
0
∂33Id[V, V ]t,
where ∂i means the partial derivative with respect to the i-th argument. Now, [V, P ] ≡ 0, since V and Z are
independent and we consider only absolutely continuous strategies, see (A1′). Also, we have that
d[P, P ]t = G
2(t, Pt)d[Y, Y ]t = G
2(t, Pt)σ
2
Z (t)dt
∂2I(t, y, v) =
y − v
G(t, y)
, (8)
so, by (5)
∂2I(t, Pt, Vt)dPt =
Pt − Vt
▽Y Pt
▽Y PtdYt = (Pt − Vt) dYt.
Moreover
∂1I(t, y, v) =
∫ y
v
−
z − v
G2(t, z)
∂1G(t, z)dz,
∂22I(t, y, v)G
2(t, y) = G(t, y)− (y − v)∂2G(t, y) (9)
and
∂2
(
∂22I(t, y, v)G
2(t, y)σ2Z
)
= −(y − v)∂22G(t, y)σ
2
Z(t),
so
∂1I(t, y, v) +
1
2
∂22I(t, y, v)G
2(t, y)σ2Z =
∫ y
v
(
− (z − v)
(
∂1G(t, z)
G2(t, z)
+
1
2
∂22G(t, z)σ
2
Z(t)
))
dz +G(t, v).
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Then by (5) and (6)
0 = ▽YDtPt +
1
2
▽3Y Ptσ
2
Z(t)
= Dt▽Y Pt +
1
2
▽3Y Ptσ
2
Z(t)
= DtG(t, Pt) +
1
2
▽2Y G(t, Pt)σ
2
Z (t)
= ∂1G(t, Pt) + ∂2G(t, Pt)DtPt +
1
2
▽Y (∂2G(t, Pt)▽Y Pt)σ
2
Z(t)
= ∂1G(t, Pt) + ∂2G(t, Pt)
(
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Pt
)
σ2Z(t) +
1
2
∂22G(t, Pt) (▽Y Pt)
2
σ2Z(t)
= ∂1G(t, Pt) +
1
2
∂22G(t, Pt)G
2(t, Pt)σ
2
Z(t). (10)
Therefore,
∂1I(t, y, v) +
1
2
∂22I(t, y, v)G
2(t, y)σ2Z(t) = G(t, v)
and ∫ T
0
(Vt − Pt) dXt −
(
I(0, P0, V0) +
1
2
∫ T
0
∂33Id[V, V ]t +
∫ T
0
G(t, Vt)dt
)
= −I(T, PT , VT ) +
∫ T
0
(Pt − Vt) dZt +
∫ T
0
∂3IdVt.
Consequently,
E
(∫ T
0
(Vt − Pt) dXt
)
− b = −E (I(T, PT , VT )) ,
where b is a constant that only depends on V . In fact, E
(∫ T
0
(Pt − Vt) dZt
)
= 0 since E
(∫ T
0
(Pt − Vt)
2
σ2Z(t)dt
)
<
∞. Furthermore, we have that
|∂3I(t, y, v)| =
∣∣∣∣
∫ y
v
−1
G(t, z)
dz
∣∣∣∣ < |y − v|C ,
therefore
E
(∫ T
0
(∂3I)
2
σ2V dt
)
<
1
C2
E
(∫ T
0
(Pt − Vt)
2
σ2V (t)dt
)
<∞,
and consequently E
(∫ T
0
∂3IdVt
)
= 0. Finally,
∂33I(t, y, v) =
1
G(t, v)
<
1
C
in a way that
1
2
∫ T
0
∂33Id[V, V ]t,
only depends on V. By (8) and (i), we have
∂2I(T, PT , VT ) =
PT − VT
G(T, PT )
= 0
and, by (9) and (i), we obtain
∂22I(T, PT , VT ) =
1
G(T, PT )
− (PT − VT ) ∂2G(T, PT ) =
1
G(T, PT )
> 0.
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So we have a maximum of −E (I(T, PT , VT )) . We also have that P is an F-martingale from (5), the integra-
bility condition and (ii). Notice that
∫ ·
0 VtdZt is a martingale since V and Z are independent. Therefore by
(i) and since V is an H-martingale, we obtain that
Pt = E (PT |Ft) = E (VT |Ft) = E (E (VT |Ht) |Ft) = E (Vt|Ft) .
Now we show that (i) and (ii) are necessary conditions. In fact (i) is necessary by Proposition 2. By (5)
and the functional Itô’s formula, we have
dPt = ▽Y PtdYt,
then the result follows from the fact that P is an F-martingale and ▽Y Pt ≥ C > 0.
We can obtain an analogous result to Theorem 2 for the non-risk-neutral case when the utility function is
U(x) = γeγx, γ < 0 and when Vt ≡ V.
Theorem 3 Let Vt ≡ V and τ = T. For any t < T , let P ∈ C
1,3
b be a price functional such that
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t) = 0, (11)
with
LPt := Dt ▽Y Pt −▽YDtPt = γσ
2
Z(t) (▽Y Pt)
2 (12)
and
▽Y Pt = G(t, Pt),
where G(t, y) ≥ C > 0 is C1,2. Assume that E
(
exp
{
1
2γ
2
∫ T
0 (Pt − V )
2
σ2Z(t)dt
})
<∞.
Then there is an equilibrium in the non-risk-neutral case, with utility function U(x) = γeγx, if and only if
(i) PT = V, (ii) Y is an F-martingale.
Proof. As in the previous proof, let
I(t, y, v) :=
∫ y
v
z − v
G(t, z)
dz,
by the Itô’s formula, we have
I(T, PT , V ) = I(0, P0, V ) +
∫ T
0
∂1Idt+
∫ T
0
∂2IdPt +
1
2
∫ T
0
∂22Id[P, P ]t,
and we can otain
∂1I(t, y, v) +
1
2
∂22I(t, y, v)G
2(t, y)σ2Z =
∫ y
v
(
− (z − v)
(
∂1G(t, z)
G2(t, z)
+
1
2
∂22G(t, z)σ
2
Z(t)
))
dz +G(t, v)
Now, by (11) and (12)
0 = ▽YDtPt +
1
2
▽3Y Ptσ
2
Z(t)
= Dt▽Y Pt − γσ
2
Z (▽Y Pt)
2 +
1
2
▽3Y Ptσ
2
Z(t)
= DtG(t, Pt) +
1
2
▽2Y G(t, Pt)σ
2
Z − γσ
2
Z (▽Y Pt)
2
= ∂1G(t, Pt) + ∂2G(t, Pt)DtPt +
1
2
▽Y (∂2G(t, Pt)▽Y Pt)σ
2
Z(t)− γσ
2
Z(t) (▽Y Pt)
2
= ∂1G(t, Pt) + ∂2G(t, Pt)
(
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Pt
)
σ2Z(t) +
(
1
2
∂22G(t, Pt)
)
σ2Z(t) (▽Y Pt)
2
− γσ2Z(t) (▽Y Pt)
2
= ∂1G(t, Pt) +
(
1
2
∂22G(t, Pt)− γ
)
σ2Z(t)G
2(t, Pt).
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Then
∂1I(t, y, v) +
1
2
∂22I(t, y, v)G
2(t, y)σ2Z = γ
(y − v)2
2
σ2Z(t) +G(t, v)
and ∫ T
0
(V − Pt) dXt −
(
I(0, P0, V ) +
∫ T
0
G(t, V )dt
)
= −I(T, PT , V ) +
∫ T
0
(Pt − V ) dZt −
1
2
γ
∫ T
0
(Pt − V )
2
σ2Z(t)dt.
Therefore,
γ exp
{
γ
∫ T
0
(V − Pt) dXt
}
exp
{
−γI(0, P0, V )− γ
∫ T
0
G(t, V )dt
}
= γ exp {−γI(T, PT , V )} exp
{
γ
∫ T
0
(Pt − V ) dZt −
1
2
γ2
∫ T
0
(Pt − V )
2
σ2Z(t)dt
}
.
Since
∂2I(T, PT , V ) =
PT − V
G(T, PT )
= 0
and
∂22I(T, PT , V ) =
1
G(T, PT )
− (PT − V ) ∂2G(T, PT ) =
1
G(T, PT )
> 0.
So the minimum value of I(T, PT , V ) is when PT = V and its value is I(T, PT , V ) :=
∫ PT
V
z−V
G(t,z)dz = 0.
Then, since γ < 0,
E
(
γ exp
{
γ
∫ T
0
(V − Pt) dXt
}
exp
{
−γI(0, P0, V )− γ
∫ T
0
G(t, V )dt
})
≤ γE
(
exp
{
γ
∫ T
0
(Pt − V ) dZt −
1
2
γ2
∫ T
0
(Pt − V )
2
σ2Z(t)dt
})
= γ.
And we get the maximum value of E
(
γ exp
{
γ
∫ T
0
(V − Pt) dXt
})
when PT = V. The rest of the proof is
analogous to the one of the previous theorem.
5 Necessary conditions for the equilibrium pricing rules
In this section we study general necessary conditions to obtain an equilibrium and we see that the classes of
price functionals of the previous section, characterised by the relationships (5) and (6) for the risk-neutral
insider and 11) and (12) for the risk-averse one, are actually justified by the arguments that follow. Note
that in this section, the release time of information τ is assumed predictable and bounded. A remark at the
end of the session deals with the case of τ independent of the observable variables.
Here below we study the effect of an ε-perturbation of the insider strategies:
dX
(ε)
t := dXt + εβtdt,
where β is a bounded adapted processes, in the prices Pt = Pt(Z·t +X·t).
From now on, we are going to assume that there exist a strictly positive B(R+)⊗ P
F-measurable1 function
K(s, t)(ω), 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ τ , ω ∈ Ω, continuous for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ τ , such that, for a.a. t,
(R) P
(ε)
t − Pt = ε
∫ t
0
K(s, t)βsds+ o (ε)Rt,
1PF denotes the F-predictable σ-field.
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when we make an ε-perturbation of the strategies. Here above P
(ε)
t := Pt(Z·t +X
(ε)
·t ), and R is a bounded
progressively measurable process. Observe that the random variables K(s, t) are strictly positive because
Pt = Pt(Y·t) is a strictly increasing functional, see Definition (1). Note that, as a consequence of (R), we
have that
lim
ε→0
P
(ε)
t − Pt
ε
=
∫ t
0
K(s, t)βsds.
Proposition 3 Assume that, for any bounded adapted process β, (R) holds by means of the kernels K
described above. Then
∇Y Pt = K(t, t).
Proof. Set
β(t)s := h
1
t− r
1[t,r](s).
Taking limits in (R) we have that, a.s. P⊗Leb,
Pt(Y
h
·t )− Pt(Y·t) = εK(t, t) + o (ε) lim sup
r↓t
Rr
By this we can conclude.
The next result presents a factorisation property of the kernel and a sufficient condition to obtain it.
Proposition 4 Let G) and F be C1,2. Assume that
∇Y Pt = G(t, Pt), (13)
and
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t) = F (t, Pt) (14)
hold. Then the kernel K admits factorisation
K(s, t) = K1(s)K2(t), (15)
with
K2(t) = E
(∫ t
0
∂2G(s, Ps)dYs
)
exp
(∫ t
0
∂2F (s, Ps)ds
)
,
where E is the stochastic exponential, and
K1(t) =
G(t, Pt)
K2(t)
.
Moreover [K1,K1] ≡ 0.
Proof. Since
Pt = P0 +∇Y PsdYs +
∫ t
0
(
DsPs +
1
2
▽2Y Psσ
2
Z(s)
)
ds
we have that,
dP
(ε)
t
dε
∣∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
∫ t
0
∂2G
dP
(ε)
s
dε
∣∣∣∣∣
ε=0
dYs +
∫ t
0
Gβsds+
∫ t
0
∂2F
dP
(ε)
s
dε
∣∣∣∣∣
ε=0
ds. (16)
Therefore
dP
(ε)
t
dε
∣∣∣∣∣
ε=0
= E
(∫ t
0
∂2G(s, Ps)dYs
)
exp
(∫ t
0
∂2F (s, Ps)ds
)
×
∫ t
0
G(s, Ps)βs
E
(∫ s
0
∂2G(u, Pu)dYu
)
exp
(∫ s
0
∂2F (u, Pu)
)ds. (17)
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This is easy to be verified by showing that the differentials and the values at t = 0 of
dP
(ε)
t
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
in (16) and
(17) are the same. Finally, by a uniqueness argument, we have that
dP
(ε)
t
dε
∣∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
∫ t
0
K1(s)K2(t)βsds,
with
K2(t) = E
(∫ t
0
∂2G(s, Ps)dYs
)
exp
(∫ t
0
∂2F (s, Ps)ds
)
,
and
K1(t) =
G(t, Pt)
E
(∫ t
0 ∂2G(u, Pu)dYu
)
exp
(∫ t
0 ∂2F (u, Pu)
) .
Finally it is easy to see that
dK1(t) =
∂1G+
1
2G
2∂22Gσ
2
Z(t)
K2(t)
dt+ ∂2G
DtPt +
1
2 ▽
2
Y Pt
K2(t)
dt−
G∂2F
K2(t)
dt. (18)
In particular we obtain the following
Proposition 5 Let P be a price functional such that (13) holds and (14) holds for F ≡ 0, i.e.
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t) = 0. (19)
Then
LPt = K2(t)
d
dt
K1(t).
Proof. By (19) we have
LPt = Dt ▽Y Pt +
1
2
▽Y
(
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t)
)
= ∂1G+
1
2
G2∂22Gσ
2
Z(t) +
1
2
∂2G
(
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Pt
)
= ∂1G+
1
2
G2∂22Gσ
2
Z(t).
Now by (18) and since F ≡ 0, we have that
LPt = K2(t)
dK1(t)
dt
.
We have obtain a general result with a necessary condition for the an optimal strategy.
Theorem 4 Assume that P ∈ C1,3b , (13) holds for G in C
1,2 and that for all β bounded (R) hods in terms
of the kernel K as above. If X is optimal, then we have
1[0,τ)(t)E (U
′(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt)| Ht)− E
(∫ τ
t∧τ
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)K(t, s)dXs
∣∣∣∣Ht
)
= 0, a.s.-P⊗Leb (20)
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Proof. Take dX
(ε)
t := dXt + εβtdt, where β is a bounded adapted processes, then,
E
(
U(W (ε)τ )− U(Wτ )
)
= E
(
U
(∫ τ
0
(
Vτ − P
(ε)
t
)
dX
(ε)
t
)
− U (Wτ ))
)
= εE
(
U ′(Wτ )
(∫ τ
0
(Vτ − Pt)βtdt−
∫ τ
0
(∫ t
0
K(s, t)βsds
)
dXt
))
+ o(ε)
= εE
(
U ′(Wτ )
(∫ τ
0
(
Vτ − Pt −
∫ τ
t
K(t, s)dXs
)
βtdt
))
+ o(ε).
Note that, by Fubini’s theorem,∫ τ
0
(∫ t
0
K(s, t)βsds
)
dXt = E
(∫ τ
0
(∫ τ
t
K(t, s)dXs
)
βtdt
)
.
Then
dE
(
U
(
W
(ε)
τ
))
dε
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ε=0
= 0
implies that
E
(∫ τ
0
U ′(Wτ )
(
Vτ − Pt −
∫ τ
t
K(t, s)dXs
)
βtdt
)
= 0.
Since we can take βt = αu1(u,u+h](t), with αu measurable and bounded and τ is a stopping time, we have
that
1[0,τ)(t)E
(
U ′(Wτ )
(
Vτ − Pt −
∫ τ
t
K(t, s)dXs
)∣∣∣∣Ht
)
= 0,
a.s.-P⊗Leb. And, from the Law of Iterated Expectations
1[0,τ)(t)E (U
′(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt)|Ht)− E
(∫ τ
t
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)K(t, s)dXs
∣∣∣∣Ht
)
= 0
The result above allows us to give some necessary conditions for an equilibrium.
Proposition 6 In the conditions of the Theorem 4 and assuming that the factorisation (15) holds, we have
that if (P,X) is an equilibrium, then
0 = E (U ′(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt)| Ht)
d
dt
(
1
K1(t)
)
−
E (U ′(Wτ )| Ht)
K1(t)
(
DtPt +
1
2
▽2 Ptσ
2
Z(t)
)
−
1
K1(·)
d
dt
[P,E (U ′(Wτ )| H·)]
t
0 +
d
dt
[
E (U ′(Wτ ) (Vτ − P·)| H·) ,
1
K1(·)
]t
0
. (21)
Proof. Thanks to (A1′), (R), the factorisation property (15), and by means of Theorem 1 and Proposition
3, we have that
E
(∫ τ
t
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)K(t, s)dXs
∣∣∣∣Ht
)
= K1(t)E
(∫ τ
t
1
K1(s)
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)K(s, s)dYs
∣∣∣∣Ht
)
= K1(t)E
(∫ τ
t
1
K1(s)
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)
(
dPs −
(
DsPs +
1
2
▽2Y Psσ
2
Z(s)
)
ds
)∣∣∣∣Ht
)
= K1(t)E
(∫ τ
t
1
K1(s)
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs) dPs
∣∣∣∣Ht
)
−K1(t)E
(∫ τ
t
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)
K1(s)
(
DsPs +
1
2
▽2Y Psσ
2
Z(s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ht
)
.
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Moreover, observe that∫ t
0
1
K1(s)
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs) dPs =
E (U ′(Wτ )| Ht)Pt
K1(t)
−
E (U ′(Wτ )| H0)P0
K1(0)
−
∫ t
0
Psd
(
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)
K1(s)
)
−
[
P,
E (U ′(Wτ )| H·)
K1(·)
]t
0
.
Hence, taking (20) into account, we obtain
1[0,τ)(t)
(
E (U ′(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt)| Ht)
K1(t)
)
+
E (U ′(Wτ )| Ht∧τ )Pt∧τ
K1(t ∧ τ)
−
E (U ′(Wτ )| H0)P0
K1(0)
−
∫ t∧τ
0
Psd
(
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)
K1(s)
)
−
[
P,
E (U ′(Wτ )| H·)
K1(·)
]t∧τ
0
−
∫ t∧τ
0
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)
K1(s)
(
DsPs +
1
2
▽2Y Psσ
2
Z(s)
)
ds
+ E
(∫ τ
0
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs)
K1(s)
(
DsPs +
1
2
▽2Y Psσ
2
Z(s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ht
)
− E
(∫ τ
0
1
K1(s)
E (U ′(Wτ )| Hs) dPs
∣∣∣∣Ht
)
= 0.
Then by the uniqueness of the canonical decomposition in the previous equation (notice that the jump of
1[0,τ)(t) is killed in the case that τ is predictive), we have
0 = E (U ′(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt)| Ht)
d
dt
(
1
K1(t)
)
−
E (U ′(Wτ )| Ht)
K1(t)
(
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t)
)
−
1
K1(t)
d
dt
[P,E (U ′(Wτ )| H·)]
t
0 +
d
dt
[
E (U ′(Wτ ) (Vτ − P·)| H·) ,
1
K1(·)
]t
0
.
Moreover, we have the following specific conditions in the risk-neutral and risk-averse (exponential) cases.
Proposition 7 In the risk-neutral case, under the assumptions of Proposition 6, if (P,X) is an equilibrium,
then
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t) = 0
holds (see (14) and (19). Also, if Vt 6= Pt, a.s. P⊗Leb, we have that
LPt = 0. (22)
Proof. As a consequence of Proposition 6 we have that, in the risk neutral case, for the functionals above,
0 = (Vt − Pt)
d
dt
(
1
K1(t)
)
−
1
K1(t)
(
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Pt
d[Z]t
dt
)
By the competitiveness of prices E(Vt|Ft) = Pt, so by taking conditional expectations w.r.t Ft we obtain
that
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Pt
d[Z]t
dt
= 0
and if Vt 6= Pt, a.s. P⊗Leb,
d
dt
(
1
K1(t)
)
= 0. (23)
Now by Proposition 5 we obtain (22).
Consider the risk-averse case when U(x) = γeγx with γ < 0. If the noise traders total demand Z is Gaussian
we can apply the following relationship between vertical and Fréchet or Malliavin derivatives (see Theorem
6.1 in [12]):
E
(
DZt U(Wτ )
∣∣Ht) = ∇ZE (U(Wτ )| Ht) .
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Then by (20)
E
(
U
′
(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt) +D
Z
t U(Wτ )
∣∣∣Ht) = 0,
we have that
∇ZE (U(Wτ )| Ht) = −E
(
U
′
(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt)
∣∣∣Ht) .
Since U ′(x) = γU(x), we obtain
∇ZE (U
′(Wτ )| Ht) = −γE
(
U
′
(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt)
∣∣∣Ht)
d [P,E (U ′(Wτ )| H·)]
dt
= ∇Y Pt∇ZE
(
U
′
(Wτ )
∣∣∣Ht)σ2Z(t) = K(t, t)E(U ′(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt)∣∣∣Ht)σ2Z(t).
Then (21) becomes
E (U ′(Wτ ) (Vτ − Pt)| Ht)
(
d
dt
(
1
K1
)
+ γK2(t)σ
2
Z(t)
)
−
E (U ′(Wτ )| Ht)
K1(t)
(
DtPt +
1
2
▽2 Ptσ
2
Z(t)
)
= 0.
Furthermore, if Vt ≡ V we have that
(V − Pt)
(
d
dt
(
1
K1
)
+ γK2(t)σ
2
Z(t)
)
−
1
K1(t)
(
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t)
)
= 0.
Taking the conditional expectations w.r.t Ft, by the competitiveness of prices E (V |Ft) = P t, we obtain that
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t) = 0.
Provided that V 6= Pt, a.s. P⊗Leb, we have that
d
dt
(
1
K1(t)
)
+ γK2(t)σ
2
Z(t) = 0. (24)
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Consider the risk-averse case with utility function is U(x) = γeγx, γ < 0. Let Vt ≡ V and
assume that (15) holds. Also assume that Z is Gaussian. If (P,X) is an equilibrium, we have (19):
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z(t) = 0
and, if V 6= Pt, a.s. P⊗Leb, we have that
LPt = γσ
2
Z (∇Y Pt)
2
.
Proof. By (24)
1
K21 (t)
d
dt
K1(t) = γK2(t)σ
2
Z(t),
now by Proposition 5 and Proposition 3
LPt = γK
2
1(t)K
2
2 (t)σ
2
Z (t) = γ (∇Y Pt)
2
σ2Z(t).
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Remark 6 Finally, according to [14] and for the above functionals if the horizon τ is random and inde-
pendent of the rest of processes involved, in an equilibrium situation we have
d
dt
P(τ > t)
K1(t)
= 0,
then
d
dt
K1(t) = K1(t)
d
dt
P(τ > t),
and by Proposition 5
LPt = K2(t)
dK1(t)
dt
= K1(t)K2(t)
d
dt
P(τ > t)
= ▽Y Pt
d
dt
P(τ > t).
6 Examples of equilibrium pricing rules
Consider the following class of functionals
Pt = H(t, ξt), t ≥ 0, ξt :=
∫ t
0
λ(s, Ps)dYs,
where λ ∈ C1,2 is a strictly positive function and H ∈ C1,3 with H(t, ·) strictly increasing for every t ≥ 0.
Then, by using the Itô’s formula and omitting the arguments in the functions, we have
dPt = ∂2HλdYt +
(
∂1H +
1
2
∂22Hλ
2σ2Z
)
dt.
Furthermore, we have that
DtPt = ∂1H + ∂2HDtξt = ∂1H −
1
2
∂2H ▽
2
Y ξtσ
2
Z
= ∂1H −
1
2
∂2H ▽Y λσ
2
Z
= ∂1H −
1
2
∂2H∂2λ▽Y Ptσ
2
Z
and
▽2Y Pt = ∂2λ▽Y Pt∂2H + λ∂22H ▽Y ξt
= ∂2λ▽Y Pt∂2H + λ
2∂22H.
Consequently,
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z = ∂1H +
1
2
∂22Hλ
2σ2Z .
Then, under the condition
DtPt +
1
2
▽2Y Ptσ
2
Z = 0,
we have that
∂1H +
1
2
∂22Hλ
2σ2Z = 0,
and by Proposition 4,
K(s, t) =
λ(s, Ps)
ηs
∂2H(t, ξt)ηt,
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where
ηt := E
(∫ t
0
∂2H∂2λdYs
)
.
Therefore K(s, t) = K1(s)K2(t), with
K1(s) =
λ(s, Ps)
ηs
,K2(t) = ∂2H(t, ξt)ηt.
By using the Itô formula we obtain that
d
(
1
K1(s)
)
= ηsd
(
1
λ
)
+
1
λ
dηs + d
[
η,
1
λ
]
s
= −ηs
∂1λ
λ2
ds− ηs
∂1λ
λ2
∂2HλdYs −
1
2
ηs
λ2∂22λ− 2 (∂1λ)
2
λ
λ4
(∂2H)
2
λ2σ2Zds
+
1
λ
ηs∂1λ∂2HdYs −
(∂1λ∂2H)
2
λ
σ2Zηsds
= −ηs
∂1λ
λ2
ds−
1
2
∂22λ (∂2H)
2
σ2Zηsds
= −ηs
(
1
2
∂22λ (∂2H)
2
σ2Z +
∂1λ
λ2
)
ds,
Then, we have that
LPt = K2(t)
d
dt
K1(t) = K2(t)K
2
1 (t)ηt
(
1
2
∂22λ (∂2H)
2
σ2Z +
∂1λ
λ2
)
= ∂2Hλ
2
(
1
2
∂22λ (∂2H)
2
σ2Z +
∂1λ
λ2
)
= ∂2H
(
∂1λ+
1
2
σ2Z (λ∂2H)
2
∂22λ
)
Hence, we will have an equilibrium price rule, in the risk-neutral case, if
∂1H +
1
2
∂22Hλ
2σ2Z = 0,
∂1λ+
1
2
σ2Z (λ∂2H)
2
∂22λ = 0.
and in the non risk-neutral case, for the exponential risk aversion, if
∂1H +
1
2
∂22Hλ
2σ2Z = 0,
and
LPt = ∂2H
(
∂1λ+
1
2
σ2Z (λ∂2H)
2
∂22λ
)
= γ (∇Y Pt)
2
σ2Z
= γK21(t)K
2
2 (t)σ
2
Z = γ (∂2Hλ)
2
σ2Z
that is
∂1λ
λ2
+
1
2
σ2Z (∂2H)
2
∂22λ = γ∂2Hσ
2
Z . (25)
We can identify some particular cases.
For the risk-neutral case
• λ(t, x) = λ > 0, and H(t, x) harmonic with H(, x) strictly increasing. Notice that in this case it is
sufficient to require that H(t, x) is C1,2 since (10) is trivially satisfied.
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• If we take H(t, x) = x and λ(t, x) = λ > 0, we have
Pt = P0 + λYt,
that corresponds to the Bachelier model for Z Gaussian.
• If H(t, x) = x and λ(t, x) = λx, we have
Pt = P0e
λYt−
1
2λ
2t
that is the Black-Scholes model.
For the non risk-neutral model
• Note that H(t, x) harmonic and λ constant cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore equilibrium prices
cannot be a function of the spot aggregate demand.
• If we take H(t, x) = x and λ(t, x) = Cx(1 − x), with C > 0, we have that (25) becomes
1
2
∂xxλ = γ
that is γ = −C. This model will give prices in (0, 1) and if Y is a Brownian motion B we have that
dPt = CPt(1− Pt)dBt
and this is the well-known Kimura model in population genetics, see Kimura(1964).
7 Examples of equilibrium models
It is apparent that depending on the behaviour of the fundamental value and the aggregate demand of the
noise traders we can have an equilibrium with one or another equilibrium pricing rule. If the aggregate
demand Z of the noise traders is a Brownian motion with variance σ2Z , Y = X + Z will be also an F-
Brownian motion with variance σ2Z , because of Theorem 2 and the Lévy Theorem. Consequently, we will
have an equilibrium if the pricing rule Pt(Y·t) is such that PT (Y·T ) = VT . Note also that the strategy X will
be just obtained as the canonical decomposition of the F-Brownian motion Y under the filtration H.
Consider the case where Z is a Brownian motion with variance σ2 and Vt ≡ V . In such a situation we have a
necessary and sufficient condition for and equilibrium for both, the risk-neutral case and the risk-adverse case
under the exponential utility. Also in both cases the equilibrium pricing rules give prices that are continuous
diffusions:
dPt = λ(t, Pt)dYt
where dYt = σdWt and W is a standard Brownian motion. In the risk-neutral case λ(t, x) satisfies
∂tλ+
1
2
λ2σ2∂xxλ = 0,
and in the risk-adverse case
∂tλ+
1
2
λ2σ2∂xxλ = γλ
2σ2.
In any case the additional necessary and sufficient condition to have an equilibrium model is to find a strategy
such that PT = V and at the same time Y is certainly a Brownian motion with variance σ
2. We have to find
αt(V ),with αt(x) Ft-measurable, such that the equation
dYt = αt(V )dt+ dZt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
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with V = PT and independent of Z, has a strong solution. In order to do so, we can look for certain
α(t, x, Y·t), where x is a fixed value of PT and try to find a strong solution of
dYt = αt(x)dt+ dZt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
later we can insert V instead of y, but we need Y to be a Brownian motion with variance σ2. Sufficient
conditions to have a strong solution are given, e.g., in Theorem 4.6, Lipster and Shiryaev (2001). Then
αt(x) has to be the drift in the canonical decomposition of Y when YT and Z·t are known at time t. The
following propositions are useful to find α, here we assume that Ft = σ¯ (W·t, t ≥ 0) , σ¯ denotes the σ-field
corresponding to the usual augmentation of the natural filtration.
Proposition 9 Assume that for any bounded and measurable function f there exists a B[0, T ]) ⊗ FT -
measurable process ξ such that
f(PT ) = E(f(PT ))+
∫ T
0
E (f(PT )ξt|Ft) dWt,
with
∫ T
0
|ξt| dt <∞. Then W· −
∫ ·
0
αt(PT )dt is an (Ft ∨ σ(PT ))-Brownian motion with
αt(PT ) = E (ξt|Ft ∨ σ(PT ))
Proof. Let f be a measurable and bounded function and A ∈ Fs, with s ≤ t. Then
E ((Wt −Ws)1Af(PT )) = E
(
1A
∫ t
s
E (f(PT )ξu|Fu) du
)
= E
(
1Af(PT )
∫ t
s
E (ξu|Fu ∨ σ(PT )) du
)
.
Proposition 10 Suppose that
dPPT |Ft(x|Ft) = LT (x;W·t)µ (dx)
is a regular version of the conditional probability of PT given Ft, µ being a reference measure and such that
i) LT (x;W·t) > 0 for all (x, ω) µ⊗ P-a.s.,
ii) ∇W
∫
R
f(x)LT (x;W·t)µ (dx) =
∫
R
f(x)∇WLT (x;W·t)µ (dx) .
Then W· −
∫ ·
0 αt(PT )dt is an (Ft ∨ σ(PT ))-Brownian motion with αt(x) = ∇W logLT (x;W·t), provided that
logLT (x;W·t) ∈ C
1 (W ) .
Proof. Let f be a measurable and bounded function
∇WE (f(PT )|Ft) = ∇W
∫
R
f(x)LT (x;W·t)µ (dx)
=
∫
R
f(x)∇WLT (x;W·t)µ (dx)
=
∫
R
f(x)∇W logLT (x;W·t)LT (x;W·t)µ (dx)
= E (f(PT )∇W logLT (PT ;W·t)|Ft) .
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Example 3 Assume that Pt = P0 + σWt. Then PT |Ft ∼N
(
P0 + σWt, σ
2(T − t)
)
, that is
dPPT |Ft(x|Ft) =
1√
2piσ2(T − t)
exp
{
−
1
2σ2(T − t)
(x− P0 − σWt)
2
}
dx,
then
αt(x) =
σ (x− P0 − σWt)
σ2(T − t)
,
that is
αt(PT ) =
WT −Wt
T − t
.
Example 4 Assume that Pt = P0 +
∫ t
0 G(u, Pu)dWu. G ∈ C
1,2,E
(∫ T
0 G
2(t, Pt)dt
)
< ∞. Let ps,t(x, y) the
transition density corresponding to the Markov process P . Then according to the previous proposition
αt(y) = ∇W log pt,T (Pt, y)
= ∂1 log pt,T (Pt, y)∇WPt
= ∂1 log pt,T (Pt, y)G(t, Pt).
For instance, we can consider the simple case where Pt = P0 +
∫ t
0
σPudWu, then, for s ≤ t, Pt =
Ps exp
{
σ (Wt −Ws)−
1
2σ
2(t− s)
}
, and
ps,t(x; y) =
1√
2piσ2(T − t)
exp
{
−
1
2σ2(T − t)
(
log y − log x−
1
2
σ2(t− s)
)2}
1
y
,
consequently
αt(y) = ∂1 log pt,T (Pt, y)G(t, Pt) = σ
log y − logPt −
1
2σ
2(t− s)
σ2(T − t)
,
that is
αt(PT ) =
WT −Wt
T − t
.
Notice that in thsi case we obtain the same result as in the previous example. This is not surprising since in
both cases to know PT is the same as to know WT since PT is an increasing function of WT . Obviously this
will not be the case for a general diffusion. The simplest case where this does not happen is the equilibrium
price model
Pt = P0 +
∫ t
0
λ(s)dWs,
with
∂tλ = γλ
2σ2.
arising in the non-risk-neutral model. Now PT |Pt ∼ N
(
P0,
∫ t
0
λ2(s)ds
)
, then
αt(x) = ∇W logLT (x;W·t)
=
λ(t) (x− Pt)∫ T
t
λ2(s)ds
.
If we consider the Kimura model, with risk-aversion parameter γ < 0,
Pt = P0 − γ
∫ t
0
Pt(1 − Pt)dWt,
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then the transition density is given by (see Kimura(1964))
pt,T (Pt, x) =
1√
2piγ2(T − t)
√
Pt(1 − Pt)(√
x(1 − x)
)3 exp

−
γ2
8
(T − t)−
(
log x(1−Pt)(1−x)Pt
)2
2γ2(T − t)

 ,
and we have that
αt(y) = ∇W logLT (x;W·t)
=
1
2
(1− 2Pt) +
log x(1−Pt)(1−x)Pt
γ2(T − t)
.
Example 5 We can consider the case where the privilege information is the time, say τ , where a Brownian
motion reaches for the first time a level a. Then, assume that
PT = h(T ∧ τ)
for a measurable and bounded function h. Now we have that
PT = P0 +
∫ T
0
∇WE (h(T ∧ τ)|Ft) dWt,
then since
fτ (u|Ft) =
Wt − a√
2pi(u− t)3
exp
{
−
(Wt − a)
2
2(u− t)
}
1{τ>t},
we obtain that
αt(u) = ∇W log fτ (u|Ft) =
(
1
Wt − a
−
Wt − a
u− t
)
1{τ>t}.
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